Until recently, few people in mainland China would dispute the significance of the hukou (household registration) system in affecting their life --indeed, in determining their fates. 1 In the West, a number of China scholars, notably Christiansen, Chan, Cheng and Selden, and Mallee, 2 have begun in recent years to study this important subject in relation to population mobility. Their work has significantly expanded our understanding. Unlike population registration systems in many other countries, the Chinese system was designed not merely to provide population statistics and identify personal status, but also to directly regulate population distribution and serve many other important objectives desired by the state. In fact, the hukou system is a major tool of social control employed by the state. Its functions go far beyond simply controlling population mobility.
Largely based on documentary research of regulations and policy documents relating to the hukou system, this paper seeks to contribute to this body of literature, by augmenting and updating our knowledge about the hukou system in relation to rural-urban migration. Specifically, this paper elucidates the complex workings of the hukou conversion process, especially the crucial nongzhuanfei process (converting the hukou status from agricultural to non-agricultural one), by studying at a number of aspects of the system that have only been scantly touched in the Western literature.
3 On this basis, the paper also reviews changes of the hukou policy in the post-Mao era, such as the introduction of new types of town hukou and "blue-stamp" hukou, and discusses their consequences. We would argue that the hukou system was designed not as a system to block rural-urban migration, as commonly portrayed in the Western literature. Instead, it was part of a larger economic and political system set up to serve multiple state interests. Its power in controlling people's life has declined in the reform era in the wake of enormous social and economic changes and dramatic rise in rural-urban mobility. This paper reveals that the role of hukou system in the administration of rural-urban migration in mainland China is far more complicated than we used to understand.
The Hukou System and the Control of Rural-Urban Migration
The hukou system was established in cities in the PRC in 1951 4 and extended to the rural areas in 1955. 5 It was formalized as a permanent system in 1958. 6 Despite of significant modifications since the early 1980s, the system remains unchanged in nature today.
Different views have been forwarded to explain or rationalize the existence of such a control system. The official interpretation argues the hukou system as serving for the consolidation of socialist system and public interests. 7 The functions of the system on regulating population distribution and controlling migration have never been the main objectives of the system as far as the government is concerned. To the government, the hukou system is not set up for the purpose of blocking any rural-urban migration but for the overall state administration. The hukou system provides the state with means and information that could be used for securing social and political order and other related objectives. In fact, the Constitution promulgated in 1954 still maintained the citizen's right of free residential choice and migration. These provisions were taken out when the Constitution was next revised in 1975.
In the literature the dominant explanation is economic and it regards the hukou system as an unavoidable choice under the "forging ahead" or the heavy-industry-oriented development strategy. 8 China's resource endowments were characterized as capital-scarce but labor-abundant. The economy was largely agrarian in the early days of the PRC. Influenced by the Soviet model, China placed high priority on heavy industry to speed up its industrialization. In order to finance the expansion of heavy industry, the state underpriced agricultural products and overpriced industrial products to induce an unequal exchange between the agricultural and industrial sectors. To maintain this artificial imbalance under the condition of dual economy, the state had to create a system which blocked free flows of resources (including labor) between industry and agriculture and between city and the countryside. The hukou system was one of the important institutions to create and maintain such a social and economic configuration. Under this perspective, the hukou system has served the function of migration control. ), (Beijing: China People's Public Security University Press, 1984). 7 For detailed discussion of the official interpretation of the hukou system, see Luo Rui Qing (the former head of the Ministry of Public Security),"Guanyu zhonghua renmin gongheguo hukou dengji tiaoli caoan de shuoming (Interpreting the regulations on household registration in the People's Republic of China", People's Daily, January 9, 1958. Also see Zhang Qingwu, "Basic facts on the household registration system," Chinese Economic Studies, Vol.22, No.1, (1988) .
The Dual Classification of Hukou Registration
To better understand the role the hukou system has played in the process of rural-urban migration, we first need to examine some unique features of Chinese hukou system. In mainland China, all PRC nationals' personal hukou status is classified by two related parts: one by residential location and one by socioeconomic eligibility (often confusingly called "agricultural"/"non-agricultural"). The process of hukou conversion is quite complicated and has significance to our understanding of reforms and problems in the 1980s and 1990s. The following explains the nuts and bolts of the system.
The first classification of one's hukou registration is the "hukou suozaidi" (the place of hukou registration). It is based on one's presumed permanent residence. Under hukou regulation each citizen is required to register in one and only one place of regular residence. The most common categories of the place of hukou registration are urban centers (cities or towns) or rural settlements (villages or state farms). The local regular hukou registration defines one's rights for social and economic activities in a specified locality. The supply of staple food and meats, for example, was based on the local hukou in the period when major daily necessities were rationed.. Openings of many jobs, even today, are limited to local hukou holders. When people conduct business outside their place of regular hukou registration, they are often required to have approval or certification documents issued by the administrative authorities in their place of regular hukou registration.
The second classification is the "hukou leibie" (the "status" or type of hukou registration), essentially referred to the "agricultural" and "non-agricultural" hukou. This classification determines one's entitlement to get the state-subsidized grain and other privileges and is often more important than the hukou place of registration. This classification originated from the occupational division in the 1950s, but later on as the system evolved, the "agricultural" and "nonagricultural" distinction bears no necessary relationship with the actual occupations of the holders.
9 Rather, the classification reflects different types of socioeconomic eligibility and the different relationships with the state within the established framework. 9 With the introduction of nationwide state monopoly and rationing system for grain in 1955, citizens living in the officially-designated urban areas and engaging in non-agricultural activities at that time were classified as nonagricultural (feinongye) hukou population; others as agricultural (nongye) hukou population. The non-agricultural hukou population was entitled to have state-subsidized but rationed grain supply. This qualification was attached to one's hukou registration. See State Council, Guanyu shizhen lianshi dingliang gongying zanxing banfa (Interim Measures for Rationed Supply of Grain in Cities and Towns), issued on August 25, 1955). Later, those qualified to obtain state subsidized grain supply were all classified as non-agricultural household registration (feinongye hukou) by the hukou system, otherwise, agricultural, regardless of their actual occupations and residences. The non-agricultural hukou can be granted to the state bureaucracy in agricultural industry such as the state farm. In the context of hukou registration, non-agricultural or agricultural hukou is not a pure occupational division. The "agricultural" and "non-agricultural" populations here are not the same as those commonly defined by occupations. See Kam Wing Chan and Kai Yuen Tsui, "'Agricultural' and 'non-agricultural' population statistics of the People's Republic of China: definitions, findings and comparisons," Occasional Paper No.1, Department of Geography and Geology, University of Hong Kong, (1992).
Since two classifications are based on different criteria, urban areas contain both non-agricultural hukou population as well as agricultural hukou population. 10 Similarly, non-agricultural hukou population may exist in urban areas or the countryside. While this fine point is noted in studies on urban definitions and related topics, 11 in the general literature they are mostly lumped or mixed together (either out of convenience or ignorance) as simply "rural" and "urban" populations.
The dual classification of hukou registration is important for the state to facilitate rural-urban migration control in the sense that the hukou registration creates two bureaucratic barriers for rural-urban migrants. Using the residence classification, the state confines people's activities in specific localities. By the "agricultural/non-agricultural" classification, the state separates the society into two parts, and imposes huge barriers for people with agricultural hukou to convert their hukou status. Conversion of one's hukou registration is far from a matter of personal choice. The designation of hukou registration place and status for a person is inherited from that of his or her mother. Indeed, this is very much a "birth-subscribed" system. 12 Change of the hukou registration (either the registered place or the registered status or both) has to go through a process of seeking approval from the government. And this is not easily granted in the case of rural-urban migration.
With the dual classification, any officially sanctioned rural-urban migration (referred to as the "formal" rural-urban migration in this paper) is required to complete a corresponding dual approval process: changing the place of regular hukou registration and converting the hukou status from agricultural to non-agricultural one. The latter is an important process commonly called nongzhuanfei in China. In other words, formal rural-urban migration involves both a geographical spatial change in one's residential place and a conversion in one's entitlement status (see row A in Table 1 ). In applying for changing the place of regular hukou registration, the applicant needs to present appropriate documents to the public security authorities to obtain a migration permit. 13 In the case of nongzhuanfei, one has to satisfy the qualifications stipulated by 10 This was a major source of confusion of "urban" population definitions, as has been first examined by Chan 13 According to Article 10 and Article 13 of Regulations on Household Registration in the People's Republic of China, in both cases of moving out and moving in, one usually needs to apply for both a permit to move (zhun qian zhen) and a migration certificate (qian yi zhen) issued by the police in the destination and the origination respectively. The hukou registration authority will check up on the situation, the number of people moving, the reasons for the move, the time of moving, their origin or destination, and so forth. There are different requirements for applying for a permit to move and a migration certificate to urban areas, depending on the situation. Those who are recruited by the state or admitted by the high-education institutes are automatically entitled to migration the state and go through the official channels. The granting of a full urban residence status is often contingent upon successfully completing nongzhuanfei. 14 In fact, nongzhuanfei implies an urban residence status in most cases.
The Dual Control Mechanism of Nongzhuanfei (Conversion from Hukou Status from Agricultural to Non-agricultural)
The key to regulating formal rural-to-urban migration under the hukou system is to control nongzhuanfei. To further complicate things, nongzhuanfei is subject to simultaneous "policy" (zhengce) and "quota" (zhibiao) controls. 15 The policy control defines the qualifications of people entitled to non-agricultural hukou, whereas the quota control regulates the number of qualified people who are able to get the non-agricultural hukou. 16 In order to be eligible for nongzhuanfei, a person has to first satisfy the conditions laid out under the policy control whilst obtaining a space under the quota control at the same time. If one fulfils the former criterion but does not have a space, he or she will not be able to succeed nongzhuanfei. The principal way it works is very similar to the US immigration visa permit system used to regulate admission of immigrants, with some exceptions.
17 Therefore, through both policy and quota controls, the state regulates the kinds of people and the size it wants to admit into the urban areas each time.
Furthermore, there are two channels through which nongzhuanfei is granted: the "regular" channels and the "special" channels (see Table 2 ). papers if such recruitment or admission requires relocation, upon the presence of valid recruitment or admission documents (see Appendix 2 for the documents required for hukou registration in cities). Those who move for personal reasons must satisfy the principles and requirements set by the MPS since 1962 in order to obtain migratory documents (see Appendix 1 for the qualifications). Lynn T. White offers more detailed information on how to apply for Shanghai's household registration, one of the three top cities where inmigration has been strictly controlled up to now. See Lynn T. White, "Migration and politics on the Shanghai Delta," Issues and Studies, Vol.30, No.9 (1994), pp.63-95.
Regular Channel: The common categories include recruitment by a state-owned enterprise (zhaogong), enrolment in an institution of higher education (zhaosheng), promotion to senior administrative jobs (zhaogan), and migration for personal reasons. The qualifications for conversion through this channel have not changed much over time, although the quota varies annually.
Special Channel: The categories of conversion of hukou status under this are defined by temporary policies concerning nongzhuanfei for certain groups of people under special circumstances. Most commonly, these involve workers changing from temporary to regular positions in state enterprises, and other special situations that arise from time to time (like return of rusticated youths in the early reform era). This channel gives the state the flexibility to deal with unanticipated, special situations. This channel also includes nongzhuanfei granted to a small proportion of demobilized military servicemen who are assigned urban jobs. The hukou spaces under the special channel come out of occasional but extra, special quotas for these transfers. As one can seen from the ways these policies were designed, very often an non-agricultural hukou status was used as a reward for those who had bore special hardships (see discussions in next section). Conversely, one could lose one's non-agricultural status by committing certain serious crime.
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Many governmental departments have de facto approving nongzhuanfei powers through their policies, though the final issuance is in the hands of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). Within the regular channel, the policies of recruitment, enrollment, and promotion are made by labour, education, and personnel authorities, respectively, and the transfer quotas associated with these policies are ultimately set by the economic planning bureaucracy when they formulate the annual economic plans. Migration for personal reasons, mostly referring to sick or disabled spouses or parents, or dependent children relocating to the urban areas to be looked after by their family members, is controlled by the policies of MPS (see Appendix 1) and is restricted by the quota set by the MPS. 19 In many cases, policies for the hukou transfer under the special channel are joint decisions of various government departments (see Table 2 ). 19 Under the hukou system, one who has successfully obtained a formal urban hukou does not necessarily mean that one's family members are also entitled for formal urban hukou registration. Instead, they need to apply for nongzhuanfei from local police and were subject to the quota control if they want to get urban hukou for the reason of family reunion. The Ministry of Public Security formulated detailed qualifications and quotas for this kind of people (Appendix 1). The annual quota for the transfer from agricultural to non-agricultural hukou set by the police was fixed at 2 per thousand of non-agricultural hukou population in 1977 and was changed to 1. The Role of the Hukou System in the Control of Rural-Urban Migration
The above has described an approval process of formal rural-urban migration that is much more complicated than has been portrayed in the existing Western literature. The complication also lies in the fact that while the hukou system has played an important role in the limiting the flows of people from the rural sector to the urban sector, there are other significant factors involved in the process.
Formal rural-urban migration is administratively handled by the public security authorities, which have the executive power to implement the hukou laws and regulations 20 In 1962 the MPS intensified the control of formal rural-urban migration and specified more precisely the rule. The new stipulations were that formal migration from rural to urban areas should be "rigorously" controlled but the flows in the opposite direction was allowed. Urban residents were allowed to move between cities but migration from small to big cities especially to Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Wuhan, and Guangzhou should be "severely" controlled.
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Stricter control over formal migration was implemented in 1977. 22 In addition to those laid out in the 1962 policy, migration from towns to cities, or from small cities to big cities, or from the countryside to urban suburbs were to be further controlled and limited. Changes from urban areas to the countryside, from cities to towns, from big cities to small cities, from the countryside to the countryside were generally not controlled, provided that there were "proper" reasons. Second, for the cases of nongzhuanfei directly permitted by the MPS, relatively detailed qualifications and the overall quotas were known (see Appendix 1).
However, as said before, many governments departments other than the MPS have real decisionmaking powers in granting nongzhuanfei. Although a permit to move and a migration certificate must be issued by the police and all migrants are required to complete the procedures of hukou transfer administered by the police, the police is not the sole authority responsible for approving nongzhuanfei. Appendix 2 catalogues the main documents required for hukou registration in cities. These documents must be inspected by the police when processing formal rural-urban migration. Such approvals are automatic provided the permits are deemed valid. So, in reality, many new formal urban in-migrants were admitted under policies of many other government departments (as shown in Appendix 2), depending upon the reasons of migration. According to one survey, of all formal migration to Beijing, 63% were approved by various government departments, 24% by higher-education institutes, 10% by military departments, and only 3% by the public security authorities. Other big cities had similar experience. 23 These figures show that the cases exclusively decided and controlled by the public security authorities contributed a very small percentage of total formal rural-urban migration.
In fact, while the hukou regulations explicitly stipulate the procedures for migration, they do not specify the qualifications for migration.
24 Different types of migration require different qualifications and documents, which are decided by various government departments and not the MPS. This leaves some significant latitude for different departments to interpret and design their own policies outside the hukou system. 24 According to the 1951 regulation, every urban household was required to fill out a standard hukou obtained form from the Public Security units. Would-be migrants need to cancel their current hukou registration and apply for a migration certificate when they intended to move outside the jurisdiction place of their hukou registration (hukou quanxia qu) (roughly the administrative area of a street committee in a city or the administrative area of a township). In-migrants needed to present a migration certificate, if they had one, or other "appropriate" documents. The MPS's 1955 directive stipulated similar requirements in the rural areas. Although more detailed procedures for rural to urban migration were given in the 1958 regulation (e.g. stipulating that what kinds of document should be presented in case of moving to cities), the regulation itself said nothing about the qualifications to get these documents.
The dual control mechanism of nongzhuanfei and the dual approval process of formal rural-urban migration show that rural-urban migration is strictly and heavily regulated, but they are not simply controlled by the hukou system. In the early period of the PRC the state did not use the hukou system to impose control over people's residential mobility, except that of criminals and "class enemies" (such as ex-Guomingdang officials and soldiers) who were under surveillance, and the migration toward border areas. 25 The government made efforts to relocate people from big cities to the countryside, the relocation was largely voluntary, without much coercion (though many of those resettled were defenseless "class enemies"). There were no legal or administrative barriers to entry to cities, 26 consistent with what was proclaimed in the Chinese first Constitution in 1954, which stipulated that all citizens had the freedom of migration.
Migration control through the hukou system administered executed by the police mainly serves to check unauthorized or "undocumented" migration. Past experience shows that illegal migration (those without a migration certificate) was seldom really prosecuted. When the government wanted to weed these people out, undocumented migrants were extradited. Furthermore, the real power of the hukou system in regulating migration does not come from just the system itself but lies in its integration with other social and economic control mechanisms. Particularly in the prereform period, formal migration operated within a political and economic environment such that economic activities were strictly administered by the plan system, with the state monopolizing the distribution of important goods. Few of these were available in the market at affordable prices, and people's daily lives were closely connected to and monitored by various state administrative organizations. Urban employment and labor transfers were controlled by the government. There were few chances for urban employment outside state channels. The state's monopoly of living necessities made it hard for anyone to survive outside one's hukou registration place without proper documents. People's daily lives were tightly bound to the work units (danwei) and surveilled by the police and the residential organizations (the street residents' committees in the case of city and the village committees in the case of the countryside). Violation of the hukou regulations could be easily found out. As always, this does not mean that the system is totally watertight. Undocumented migrants (often called "black households") did exist in cities. Overall, the hukou system worked with other mechanisms to form multi-layered structure of control with each single institution controlling one or more aspects of rural-urban migration; they were interrelated and complementary to each other. The effectiveness of hukou system on migration control depends much on the proper functioning of other institutions. Without them, the hukou system cannot function well to control rural-urban migration, as in the case of the reform period (to be examined in the next section).
Like many other institutions in mainland China, the hukou system is a state tool that serves the state interest and priorities in economic growth (industrialization) and in maintaining public security (political stability). In this context, its main functions have been to confine the population within the various state-defined segments and to assure the manageability. Judging from the policy documents and the practice, it is clear that the hukou system's statistical function of tracking population by residence is only secondary. In fact, as being examined in greater detail elsewhere, the hukou classification, with all its possible combination of categories, has greatly complicated the task of defining urban and rural populations. 27 The household registration system is not the PRC's invention; nor is it totally new to China. What has been implemented since 1949 is quite unique, however. Since formal rural-urban migration requires nongzhuanfei, which is subject to both policy and quota controls, as well as other economic and social mechanisms are administratively involved in the nongzhuanfei process, formal rural-urban migration was fully bureaucratized. The procedures of hukou registration certify people's reasons for legal residence in any Chinese urban area. These procedures, along with other policies related to them, allow the state to decide where people should work and reside, leaving very little room for individual's preferences and decisions in the process.
In short, the hukou system acted as a domestic passport system to draw a chasm in the Chinese society, which served to produce and reproduce social segregation and social disparity. While economic dualism (rural/urban) is characteristic of most developing countries and is also existent in China, the hukou system has reproduced a much stronger social dualism through both economic and, more importantly, institutional means such as the hukou system. The outcome is that there was also a rigid dual society in pre-reform China than in many countries. The major features of economic dualism and social dualism are summarized in Table 3 . Parallel to the industry-agriculture economic dualism, the society was segmented into the agricultural hukou holders and non-agricultural hukou holders, with vastly different opportunities, obligations and socioeconomic statuses.
28 Such a correspondence in dualism in economy and society also speaks to the importance of the industrialization strategy on the socioeconomic configuration. 
Changes of the Hukou Policies Since 1980
Reforms of the social and economic systems within which the hukou system operated were initiated since the late 1970s. The significant economic and social changes in the last two decades have put a lot of pressures on the pre-existing hukou system, leading to a number of important changes. With a significant increase in population mobility initiated by economic reforms, the population tends to be more outside their place of hukou registration. In general, the population has been more mobile in the reform era than before. Increase in mobility has started to challenge the traditional hukou registration system, which was built upon an immobile population and controlled migration.
Improving Administration of Population Registration
Faced with a more mobile population, the MPS introduced a series of measures to enhance and improve the population registration system. First, a system for administration of temporary residents was set up. 29 Temporary residents in the 1958 hukou Regulations were defined as those with short-term stay and without local regular hukou. Before 1985, only temporary stay in cities was required to register; in 1985, the system of registration was extended to towns. People of age 16 and over who intend to stay in urban areas for more than three months are required to apply (CTR, zanzhuzheng) . 30 The CTR is usually valid for one year and can be renewed. MPS has made an effort to improve the detailed records/database of urban population. Changes in the regular hukou population are counted monthly. Two types of temporary residents are differentiated.
(1) "Conventional" temporary population (changgui zanzhu renkou), referring to outside people providing domestic services, studying, visiting relatives and friends, seeking medical services, sight-seeing, and on business trip; and (2) Job-seeking temporary population (mousheng zanzhu renkou), covering outside people doing business, working in manufacturing and service sectors.
These people are required to get the CTR. Since the mid-1980s, almost all provincial and city governments have drawn up their own stipulations for the administration of the temporary population residing within their jurisdictions.
Secondly, MPS has computerized the recording system of population registration. 31 The formats of the hukou registration book and the hukou conversions have been standardized for computerization.
32 Thirdly, the hukou registration is regularly rectified, especially before approaching any big events such as a population census. Another major device used by the MPS in improving the administration of hukou registration is the system of citizen identity cards (IDC). The system was proposed in 1983 34 and experimented first in Beijing in 1984. 35 It was nationwide in 1985. 36 The application of the citizen IDC system changes the administration of population registration from one book per household in cities and towns and one book per village in the countryside to one card per person nationwide. Compared with other documents (including the hukou book), there are several advantages in using the citizen IDC to verify a person's identity. 37 Citizen IDC are easy to computerize and difficult to counterfeit technically. With a wide application, the citizen IDC has become the most important personal document to facilitate individuals' economic activities, such as applying for a job not in one's place of hukou registration), and the administration of outsiders by local governments. With a control code, a registered regular address, and the stamp endorsed by the police unit in the registration area on the citizen IDC, the authority can readily identify any outsider by examining his/her card. For those who legally and permanently change their places of regular hukou registration, they are required to change their citizen IDC. By improving registration and issuance of citizen IDC, the government has the records and information of a substantial portion of "nonlocal" population. In one official commentary, it is reported that there were about 80 million peasant workers (mingong) in the country in 1995, with 44 million of them being registered as temporary residents with the public security authorities.
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Changes in the Policy Control
In the reform period, dual classification of personal hukou status is still maintained. The mechanisms of dual channel and dual control of formal rural-urban migration have continued to 34 function. But the policy control has been changed to cope with some problems inherited from the pre-reform era, along with reforms of the centrally planned economic system.
In sharp contrast to the policies in the 1970s, the policy control in the reform era is characterized by substantial opening of the special channel of nongzhuanfei to assuage people's discontents with the pre-reform hukou policies. Since 1980, openings for granting nongzhuanfei to certain categories of people have increased substantially, covering workers in a wide range of industries and occupations (Table 4) . Such policies were issued by various governmental departments according to the interests of individual departments. Most of them were done out of political consideration, as indicated by the documents listed in Table 4 . From 1979 to 1995 the nonagricultural hukou population grew at an average of 7.8 million per year, or 3.7%, compared to an average of 2.5 million or 1.9% per year in the period between 1963 and 1978. The "Self-supplied Food Grain" Town Hukou
After decollectivization in the early 1980s, it was obvious that China needed to deal with the rapidly swelling surplus rural labor. To this end, the State Council conditionally opened the door of market towns for peasants in 1984. Peasants were allowed to get a new type of urban hukou, called "self-supplied food grain" hukou, in market towns, provided that they satisfied a number of requirements. 40 The main requirements are that these migrants must either run businesses or be employed in enterprises, 41 and have own accommodations in market towns. They must also selfprovide their own food grain. The State Council stipulated that the people with this kind of hukou be counted as non-agricultural hukou population though in practice that might be the case.
"Self-supplied food grain" town hukou possessed more symbolic than practical value in terms of actual benefits received. This kind of "urban" hukou is not the same as nongzhuanfei (see also Table 1 , row B). Holders are not eligible for state subsidized welfare; and they cannot move to other urban areas of administrative status higher than that particular town. If people holding this kind of hukou want to migrate to cities or convert their hukou status to a non-agricultural one, they must still go through the same regular nongzhuanfei procedures. In the mid-1980s, this type of hukou had certain appeal to some peasant migrant workers, as the channel of nongzhuanfei was almost totally closed to them. However, as opportunities for other types of hukou opened, this type hukou did not receive much popularity in the later years. In 1992 the application of "self-supplied food grain" hukou was officially terminated. 40 The following documents stipulate the conditions to get market towns hukou. 
The "Blue-Stamp" Urban Hukou
The "blue-stamp" urban hukou was formally launched in 1992 under MPS's "Circular on Application of Locally-Valid Urban Hukou Registration", 42 although some localities started this practice much earlier. 43 Unlike the "self-supplied food grain" hukou which was limited to only for certain business peasants and their family members in towns, the "blue-stamp" urban hukou is open to a wider population and more cities and towns, including large cities. The geographical coverage encompasses administratively-defined "small" cities and towns, and special economic zones (including those in large cities). Eligibility is primarily based on the assessed "contributions" to the urban economy. The detailed criteria are listed in Table 5 . In addition, those who are entitled to non-agricultural hukou (such as peasants with their land requisitioned by the state, person suffered from prolonged separation of spouses, and persons rehabilitated from politically unjust treatment) but still cannot get one because of a quota constraint also qualify for blue-stamp hukou. 44 The criteria listed in the table are fairly general; understandingly, interpretations and implementation of them vary from province to province and from city to city. Table 5 Qualifications for the "Blue-stamp" Urban Hukou
Areas Covered
• Administratively-defined "small" cities and towns;
• Special economic zones, economic and technical development zones, and the high-tech development zones of big cities. These zones must be licensed by the State Council or the governments at the provincial level. Many aspects of "blue-stamp" urban hukou differentiate it from the formal urban hukou (obtained through nongzhuanfei). The central government's rationale for this program was based on the principle of "local need, local benefit, local responsibility, local validity". This was to give local urban governments some flexibility of addressing their own needs. Under the situation that the central government does not fully relax the policies and quotas for nongzhuanfei, the "bluestamp" urban hukou is a policy alternative to 'legalize' a part of the de facto urban population without committing central financial obligations.
The blue-stamp hukou program, therefore, is left to local governments. Applicants, in addition to having means of living in the urban areas to which they intend to move, are required pay fees for urban infrastructural construction. The amount varies regionally, ranging from a few thousand yuan to Y50,000. 45 The number of such hukou granting depends on local conditions and is the decision of local governments. Local governments are asked to guarantee the political, if not economic, rights and obligations of the "blue-stamp" urban hukou holders to be at least the same as those of local regular urban residents. The "blue-stamp" urban hukou holders are required to resume their original hukou status when moving out of the registered urban areas. In terms of hukou registration administration, "blue-stamp" urban hukou holders do not need to apply for a migration certificate in their regular hukou registration place; and they do not need to apply for or change or replace or change their citizen IDC in the city where they are moving in. This means actually that these people are still not considered as having gone through the nongzhuanfei process in the eyes of the (central) government or with respect to the hukou system (see also Table 1 row B) .
Hukou Reform in Small Cities and Towns: The Pilot Scheme
Following the hukou reform in market towns in 1984, the government recently took another step to reform hukou policies for small towns and small county-level cities (most of which were upgraded from towns in the past few years). As part of a pilot scheme of comprehensive reforms in small towns and cities, allowing 450 pilot towns and cities to grant urban hukou for qualified rural hukou holders. 46 At the current stage, the scheme is restricted to built-up areas of those county-level cities and designated towns. The provincial governments are allowed to select some small cities and towns with a higher level of economic and infrastructural development and with financial success for a two-year experiment. If the scheme is successful, it will be extended to other cities. Rural hukou holders who have stable non-agricultural jobs or stable living support and have regular accommodations in those selected cities and towns are qualified to apply for regular urban hukou after residing there for more than two years. Their close relatives are also qualified. The qualifications for getting a town hukou under this reform scheme are not much different in nature from those of "self-supplied food grain" town hukou, except that the migrants will have to give up their use right of land in the countryside. Successful applicants will then have the same right as those regular urban residents in respect to education, employment, subsidized foodstuffs, social security and welfare benefits in the specified town or city.
Unlike the "blue-stamp" urban hukou which are subject to the "admission" charge, qualified applicants for this scheme do not have to pay this type of fees to the local governments, according to the State Council. It, however, appears that this new hukou type has the same benefits as other urban hukou in that city or town. Since regular urban residents still receive state-subsidized welfare, the number of urban hukou conferees under this reform is subject to quota control. Quotas are set by planning departments in cooperation with related bureaucracies. This reform can be regarded as a moderately significant move towards further opening up small urban centres for rural migrants and granting them legal resident status.
At this point, the real attitude of local governments towards the recent small town hukou reform is not totally certain, partly because the small town hukou reform is still in the early stage and partly because local governments are not allowed to charge entry-fees while at the same time are asked to provide the same level of social welfare as that of local formal urban hukou holders to these new comers. It appears that this program will increase the local government's fiscal burden and that it is in direct competition with the blue-stamp urban hukou program, which has been a cashcow for some local governments.
Consequences of Hukou Policy Reforms
The pre-form hukou system was set up on the premise of a non-market economy without "spontaneous", "anarchical" migration of population. The new reality in the reform era has posed many challenges to the state to continue exercising tight control of rural-urban migration and micro-manage its outcomes. On the one hand, there is no significant change in the nature of the hukou system. The hukou system reforms in the 1980s and 1990s have been characterized by conditionally opening urban residency to rural people and relaxing, to some extent, the policy but not the quota control of nongzhuanfei. But the two essential features of the hukou system -the dual classification of one's hukou registration and the dual control mechanism of nongzhuanfeibasically remain unchanged. One's socio-economic eligibility is still linked with his/her hukou status. On the other hand, economic reforms since the late 1970s have changed the previous multi-layered control structure in which the hukou system was an integrated part, thus weakening the effectiveness of the hukou system on monitoring and controlling the mobility of the population. Under the economic reforms, job openings and the distribution of daily necessity control are no longer monopolized by the state. There are many jobs in the non-state sector, and almost all daily necessities are amply available on the market today. State-subsidized welfare for urban people has been reduced. Street Committees are more keen on making money than performing social surveillance. The ongoing economic reforms and hukou system reforms have generated a series of new dilemmas in the administration of population distribution and ruralurban migration with many important consequences.
Pressure for Nongzhuanfei and Control Difficulties
Since a non-agricultural hukou status entails more privileges and opportunities, there is always a great demand for it at almost any time. As examined before, many central ministries and agencies have the power to make policies that stipulate the conditions for nongzhuanfei, presumably in response to situations within their jurisdictions. As one can expect, out of own departmental interests, these ministries tend to set policies that favor the maximum nongzhuanfei possibility for their own employees. This is especially serious in the 1980s when rehabilitation and redress of past mistakes took place, evident in the numerous special policies made by various ministries in the 1980s. Hence, large numbers of people are eligible for nongzhuanfei under various policies, as shown in Table 4 . On the other hand, the central government (mainly through the State Planning Commission and State Council) has continued to exercise tight control over the quotas allowable in each category. This laxness in policy control and the continued tightness in quota control has generated a huge imbalance between the number of those eligible for nongzhuanfei and the number of actual openings. As expected, there were a lot of bad feelings and frustrations among those who were eligible but who did not get the hukou status converted. Unlike the US immigration visa permit system in which the rules and waiting time are relatively transparent, the Chinese hukou conversion process has operated largely in a black box with no transparency. This has only aggravated the discontents of those waiting for nongzhuanfei, putting a lot of pressure on the current nongzhuanfei system.
Prevalence of the Floating Population and New Socioeconomic Divide in the City
The floating population mainly refers to those residing in places other than their hukou registration place. At present it is estimated that there are some 80-100 million floating population in the country, compared to a few millions back in the late 1970s. 47 Many of these people are de facto urban residents but they have not gone through the nongzhuanfei process. The rising predominance of the "floating population" since the mid-1980s is a consequence of a rapidly expanding market economy and a still tightly controlled nongzhuanfei regime. The former has generated enormous labor mobility (which is also tolerated, if not totally welcomed, by the government), while the latter (the quotas) has not expanded adequately to accommodate the increased demand. Economic reforms have opened more possibilities for rural people to work in urban areas, especially in large cities. Although there are some opportunities for peasant migrants to be legally registered (such as through the "self-supplied food grain households" scheme and the pilot town scheme), they are exclusively confined to towns (and small cities) where the state's social welfare obligations are minimal. For most peasant migrants in large cities, the opportunities are very limited, and even when available, they are open only to a few of the rich business migrants. For the majority, they have to settle with mostly a temporary resident status 48 or none at all.
With the opening of the city gate to peasants since the early 1980s, the institutional dualism based on the hukou divide, while continues to exist, has been exported to the city. 49 Though the Chinese urban society in the Mao period had never come close to be a real equal society, the urban social structure was relatively homogenous, made up of a great mass of wage workers in state or quasi-state sector and a tiny class of privileged cadres. In the reform era, the expansion of personal mobility and other factors have given rise a new dimension of social stratification within cities. Most notably, this divide is based on different types of urban hukou (temporary vs permanent, informal versus formal) introduced by the hukou reforms. Among urban residents, various hukou registrations reflect not as much residential variance as status difference. Most important of all, there continue to exist huge differences in economic opportunity and social position between those with urban hukou and those without (summarized in Table 6 ). 50 These caste-like disparities based on institutions not only raise the question of equity but they are also sources of discontents of the disenfranchised.
In short, a dual social structure has emerged in the cities: on the one side are those for whom jobs, housing, education, subsidized food, and medical care are an entitlement, and on the other are those who must scramble for those goods or even do without, as Solinger has characterized. 51 This breakdown is primarily, but not entirely, a matter of urban-hukou holders versus those with a rural registration. For the latter group, the prospect of moving up, getting accepted and assimilated is meager at best. In fact, the opportunity structure of today for most of these migrants still bears heavily the stamp of social stratification forged over decades by the old command system. Huge social and economic disparities exist between the peasant migrants and full-status urbanites. Before the reform, the dualism was displayed almost totally in spatial (rural/urban) terms; today. while the geographical divide has been largely broken down and millions of peasants have been "freed", their old position in the social hierarchy has not been fundamentally altered. 
Urban Hukou Sales as Local Government Revenues
Under the fiscal decentralization reforms since the 1980s to give more autonomy to local governments in financing their activities, local governments have been quick to discover the revenue potential of the new urban hukou and, in fact, have been aggressively exploiting it to their advantages. As there is no shortage of demand for a non-agricultural hukou, local governments have used the sales of urban hukou as a revenue-generating means. Thus the urban hukou has become a priced commodity. The central government in fact forbade local governments to sell urban hukou. The repeated memos from the central government serve to underline the popularity of the practice and its resilience. 52 In recent years, however, in many places, including large cities, the charge is often in the form of zengrongfei (fees for expanding urban infrastructure). 53 With increasing fiscal decentralization initiated by central government in the reform era, local governments have been quite insistent that they need to raise urban construction funds in order to accommodate more and more in-migrants. This kind of practice is legalized with the introduction of the blue-stamp hukou. This further weakens the central control of issuance of urban hukou. The commodification of the urban hukou has created a market for those who can afford. The price of an urban hukou varies geographically, largely depending on the location and urban administrative status of the place. Generally, the higher the administrative status of a city and the harder it is to migrate to, the higher the hukou price will be. One estimate reports that by early 1994, three million urban hukou books had been sold to peasants throughout the country, generating a total revenue of RMB25 billion.
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Conclusion
This paper has provided a documentary account of the origins and changes of the hukou system and examined its functions and problems in relation to rural-urban migration since the 1950s. We have analyzed the dual control operation of the nongzhuanfei and the difficulties in implementing it. The original system was set up on the premise of a command system with a strong state sector and limited labor mobility. This is increasingly incompatible with a more marketized economy and with greater population mobility. New forces have outgrown the confines of the system, leading to a number of changes in the last two decades. This paper has reviewed these changes and examined some of the major consequences.
It is clear that the hukou system is one of important institutions on which the Chinese planned economy and society is based. It is a tool of the authoritarian regime. As long as the authoritarian rule is maintained, the state wants --and needs --to keep the hukou system. In review, despite all the reforms, the essential elements of the hukou system are still there and will not be changed overnight. The hukou system still functions to constrain personal free migration and contribute to societal segregation.
The gross inequality of the system has triggered a number of harsh critiques within China, the most notable being The Unbalanced China by Guo and Liu. 55 Many scholars have also argued for the, if not immediate, abolition of the system. Inside the government, there have been serious concerns about managing the population, especially migrants and discussions of measures to reform or revamp the system. In the early 1990s the State Council led a study that involved more than ten government departments to find ways to improve the existing hukou system and the nongzhuanfei policy in light of the new situations. 56 In the Fifth Plenary Session of the Seventh National People's Congress in March 1992 and in the first Plenary Session of the Eighth National People's Congress in spring 1993, several motions were put forward on reforming the hukou system and the policy regarding formal rural-urban migration. 57 The primary focus of those motions is on delinking the association between residence status and socioeconomic eligibility. So far nothing really substantive has been passed, but the trend is toward further relaxing the control 54 Sing Tao Daily, February 8, 1994. of nongzhuanfei. The State Council has also planned to draft the PRC's household registration law and national migration law to legalize the conditions and procedures for household registration, transfer of household registration, and administration of household registration.
Despite all the reforms, the pre-existing hukou system remains relatively unscathed because of the continuing significant disparities between the state ("non-agricultural") and non-state ("agricultural") sectors. As long as this fundamental societal configuration remains unchanged, the hukou --as it is today --cannot be done away with. It is both the basis and product of an authoritarian and segmented society. To the state, in order to maintain its vast administrative power, it is necessary to keep this tool. However, the hukou system can only function effectively in a closed command economy. There is little wonder that it under rising pressure and it is increasingly incompatible with China's moves to a market economy. Given the complexity of the system and its interconnectedness with so many other social and economic mechanisms, its demise, however, will have to wait for a much more thorough and fundamental restructuring of the Chinese society than what we have seen so far. Zhu Rongji's new round of reforms, especially the reform of the state-owned enterprises, appears to be a very important step in that direction.
At a superficial level, however, China can fairly easily delink the two functions currently held by the hukou system: to classify and record people's (rural/urban) residence, and to determine one's socioeconomic eligibility. These two aspects need not be tied together in one single system. Instead, they can be separated without many problems. If one's hukou status (rural/urban) is mainly statistical, without major bearing on the eligibility for state-provided welfare benefits, students of China perhaps can some day look to the end of the Chinese statistical mess of urban/rural definitions. Of course, such a separation will not change any fundamentals of the existing societal configuration..
